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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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**Top Secret**  
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13 July 1967

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25X1

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## CONTENTS

Arab States - Israel: Continued Arab division over Israel policy. (Page 3)

Burma - Communist China: Ne Win resisting Chinese pressure but trying to avoid diplomatic break. (Page 4)

Soviet Bloc - Arab States: Bloc meeting (Page 6)

Nigeria: Stalemate in fighting (Page 6)

Hong Kong - Communist China: British troops used (Page 6)

Congo (Kinshasa): Mercenaries break out (Page 7)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010100100001-7

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010100100001-7

Arab States - Israel: Radical and moderate Arab states remain divided over whether to move toward a settlement with Israel.

Algeria and Syria are still the firmest opponents of any show of moderation. Boumediene's visit to Damascus ended yesterday with a statement, broadcast by Damascus radio, indicating the two governments are intent upon "continuing the people's struggle...in a steadfast and revolutionary spirit."

Boumediene returned to Cairo, presumably to give Nasir a report on the Algerian-Syrian meeting and to argue further against convoking a full-scale Arab summit meeting. The Algerians reportedly have strong misgivings about a summit because they fear King Husayn and other moderates would form the majority there.

Egypt has favored a summit meeting, but Nasir is unlikely to support it with much vigor now in the face of Algerian and Syrian opposition. Iraq probably will now refrain from active support of such a meeting.

The Jordanians, now faced with the virtual impossibility of obtaining a unified and relatively moderate Arab position--or even a summit meeting to discuss the question--have indicated that they will continue to try to influence Egypt and Iraq, with whom Jordan has defense agreements. Eventually, however, Husayn apparently will have to decide whether, having exhausted the possibility of unified Arab action, he can safely move unilaterally toward a settlement with Israel. He will have to weigh the extent to which this would involve renewed active hostility on the part of Arab radicals toward his regime. [REDACTED]

25X1

13 Jul 67

3

Burma - Communist China: Ne Win is continuing quietly but firmly to resist pressures from Peking while trying to avoid a diplomatic rupture.

In a note handed to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 11 July, Burma categorically rejected Peking's charges that the recent anti-Chinese incidents had been instigated and directed by the Burmese Government, but asserted that an investigation was being conducted.

Nationwide demonstrations and rallies against both Peking and the Burmese Communist Party are continuing in Burma. Most demonstrations appear to be government-sponsored and carefully controlled. Curfew hours have been relaxed in Rangoon, but government orders against unlawful assemblies have been extended another two weeks.

China's pressures so far have been confined to violent demonstrations in front of the Burmese Embassy in Peking, diatribes against General Ne Win's "fascist regime," vocal support for the Burmese Communists, and implied threats to cut off economic assistance to Burma. Unless Peking shifts to a policy of subversion and infiltration or offers major material assistance to antigovernment elements in Burma, Burmese leaders are unlikely to re-evaluate their international outlook.

The Sino-Burmese conflict has generated unprecedented popular support for the Ne Win regime and momentarily has diverted popular attention from the nation's growing economic problems. There are no clear indications whether the Burmese Government will take advantage of this opportunity to modify its "Burmese Way to Socialism" and initiate basic economic policy changes. [REDACTED]

13 Jul 67

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010100100001-7

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NOTES

Soviet Bloc - Arab States: The meeting of the top Communist leaders in Budapest on 11-12 July was largely a re-enactment of the 9 June conference in Moscow. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting promised continued consultations on the Middle East, indicating that further meetings are contemplated. While it did not signal any new bloc policy initiatives on the Middle East, an effort may be under way to develop coordination within the bloc in the supply of economic aid and military materiel to the Arab States.

[REDACTED]

\*Nigeria: Federal and Biafran forces appear to be stalemated along the northern border. Biafran Governor Ojukwu told the US consul in Enugu that the federal attack appeared to be "running out of steam." Press reports on 12 July, however, indicate a renewed attack to take Nsukka may be under way. Meanwhile, federal plans to establish a beachhead on the Biafran coast using commercially owned ships as troop transports are causing considerable alarm among the predominantly British skippers. They do not want to be put in the position of seeming to be mercenaries and reportedly would only carry troops as far as staging areas in the Mid-West.

[REDACTED]

Hong Kong - Communist China: Yesterday, for the first time in the present crisis, British authorities employed troops against the Communists in Hong Kong proper. The troops assisted the police in raiding a leftist union headquarters which was directing the riots that have plagued the colony for five days. This determined action probably presages further moves to neutralize the Communist leaders who have been operating from the relative safety of leftist-controlled buildings.

[REDACTED]

13 Jul 67

6



\*Congo (Kinshasa): Rebellious mercenaries reportedly left Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) in a convoy of 27 trucks late yesterday and headed south. They may be trying to reach Katanga Province, but they could turn east toward Bukavu and the border. The ease with which they broke through army lines suggests that recent government claims of the extent of army control in Kisangani were exaggerated.

25X1

13 Jul 67

7

25X1

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